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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1979, United States Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann
expressed frustration at what many federal prosecutors felt at the time
— whether to proceed in a criminal case knowing classified information
1
might be disclosed at trial. In various cases, including “espionage,
* J.D., University of Notre Dame, 2001; M.A., Middlebury College, 1998; B.A., University
of Notre Dame, 1996. The author is an assistant professor of law at Lincoln Memorial
University, Duncan School of Law, and worked as a trial attorney for the Department of
Justice, Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Section until July 2010 and as an Assistant United
States Attorney for Southern District of Florida from 2002 to 2006. The views expressed in
the article are the author’s, and do not reflect the views of the Department of Justice or
anyone else. The author would like to thank Robert Reid, Pat Laflin, Akram Faizer, Dave
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murder, perjury, narcotics distribution, burglary, and civil rights
2
violations, among others,” defendants and/or prosecutors wanted to
3
disclose “classified information” as evidence at trial when there was no
mechanism in place to litigate pre-trial classified-information issues. In
some instances, a prosecutor may dismiss a case rather than risk
disclosure. In response, Congress passed the Classified Information
4
Procedures Act (hereinafter “CIPA”) in 1980 to provide procedures for
any criminal case where classified information was at issue. These
procedures would protect against the disclosure of classified
information while at the same time ensuring to the defendant a right to a
fair trial. Specifically, section 4 of CIPA was designed to govern the
5
handling of classified information issues during pre-trial discovery, and
CIPA’s section 6 was designed to govern whether classified information
6
would be admissible at trial and if so, what would be introduced at trial.
During the thirty years since its passage, CIPA has been utilized in
hundreds (if not thousands) of criminal cases and is used more
frequently now than ever imagined in 1980. Yet, few prosecutors and
defense counsel are familiar with CIPA and how to handle classified
information when it is presented during the prosecution of a criminal
Dalton, Wayne Raabe, and David Walker for their invaluable comments and assistance. A
special thank you to Ken Blanco for providing the author with the opportunity to be in the
position to write this article.
1
Graymail Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis.of the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. 4-5 (1979) (statement of Philip Heymann,
Assistant Att’y Gen. ).
2
H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 6-7 (1980).
3
Most intelligence collected by intelligence agencies is classified and can’t be disclosed
as is. Each piece of information collected is assigned a particular level of classification —
the level of classification coincides with the amount of damage the disclosure to the public
(and/or the defendant) would cause to national security. Thus, classified information can be
labeled as: (1) confidential (where the unauthorized disclosure of that type of information
“could be expected to cause damage to the national security”); (2) secret (where the
unauthorized disclosure of that type of information “could be expected to cause serious
damage to the national security”); or (3) top secret (where the unauthorized disclosure of
that type of information “could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the
national security”). See Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). The
information can also be described as “sensitive compartmented information,” which “not
only is classified for national security reasons as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, but
also is subject to special access and handling requirements because it involves or derives
from particularly sensitive intelligence sources and methods.” 28 C.F.R. § 17.18(a) (2010).
4
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16).
5
Id.
6
Id.
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case. CIPA has been misunderstood and misapplied by some judges
because these rules only provide a framework for procedures on how to
handle classified information when it is introduced during a criminal
case. CIPA was not designed to establish a clear guideline on how
judges should rule on issues of fairness, legality, or whether classified
information is even relevant to the specific criminal proceeding. In fact,
Congress specifically stated that CIPA was meant only as a procedural
tool “that will permit the trial judge to rule on questions of admissibility
involving classified information before introduction of the evidence in
7
open court.” CIPA was not meant to alter the Federal Rules of
8
Evidence for determining the relevancy and admissibility of evidence.
This left judges with a pre-trial procedure with no further congressional
guidance on use, relevance, discoverability, or admissibility, other than
9
to “follow the [F]ederal [R]ules of [E}vidence.”
Part II of this article examines the Intelligence Community
(hereinafter “IC”) in the present day, the IC’s impact on federal criminal
cases today, and why CIPA is extremely important in the national
security and criminal law context. Part III explores CIPA’s progression
from a relatively innocuous bill in the Senate to its major role in
terrorism and espionage cases today, and revisions that should be made,
including providing a concrete guideline that judges should follow in
determining the discoverability and admissibility of classified
information at trial. Part IV discusses why such revisions should be
made; a straightforward set of CIPA procedures and guidelines would
eliminate ambiguous and arbitrary decisions, as well as diffuse any
concerns from defense counsel about transparency during ex parte, pretrial proceedings. Lastly, Part V addresses a prosecutor’s exigent duty to

7

S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4294; see H.R. REP.
NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 10 (1980) (“The procedures are designed to give the government
advance notice of what classified information will be admissible during trial; they are not
designed to effect the admissibility determination itself.”).
8
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1436, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4307, 4310
(“[N]othing in the conference substitute is intended to change the existing standards for
determining relevance and admissibility.”); H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 11 (1980) (“The
bill does not alter the existing rules or standards for making the substantive determination of
whether the particular information is admissible in a criminal trial.”); H.R. REP. NO. 96-831,
pt. 2, at 3 (1980) (“It is not intended to infringe on a defendant’s right to a fair trial or to
change the existing rules of evidence and criminal procedure. Rather it is intended to
provide uniformity, rationality and consistency to the present system.”).
9

H.R. Rep. No. 96-1436, (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.4310.
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search IC files and the framework needed within CIPA to clarify a
prosecutor’s discovery obligations.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND
ITS EXPANDING IMPACT IN FEDERAL COURTS
United States intelligence agencies are tasked with gathering and
analyzing reliable intelligence information on threats to the United
States’ security and providing this classified information to various
10
“users.” These users of intelligence information, in turn, are hopefully
able to make more informed decisions on national security and foreign
11
policy matters. Intelligence agencies within the IC are governed by a
variety of statutes, such as the National Security Act of 1947, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, the Counterintelligence
and Security Enhancements Act of 1994, the Department of Defense
10

According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the IC has four
goals: (1) to “enable wise national security policies by continuously monitoring and
assessing the international security environment to warn policymakers of threats and inform
them of opportunities;” (2) to “support effective national security action” by “deliver[ing]
actionable intelligence to support diplomats, military units, interagency organizations in the
field, and domestic law enforcement organizations at all levels;” (3) to “deliver balanced
and improving capabilities that leverage the diversity of the Community’s unique
competencies and evolve to support new missions and operating concepts;” and (4) to
“operate as a single integrated team, employing collaborative teams that leverage the full
range of IC capabilities to meet the requirements of our users, from the President to
deployed military units.” OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2009), available at
www.dni.gov/reports/2009_NIS.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY].
Users of intelligence include the “President, the National Security Council, the Secretaries
of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch officials for the performance of their
duties and responsibilities.” OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE 7 (2009), available at www.dni.gov/reports.htm
[hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE].
11
“The Intelligence Community (IC) is a group of executive branch agencies and
organizations that work separately and together to engage in intelligence activities necessary
for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the United
States.” NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 7.
Sixteen United States intelligence agencies comprise the IC and are under the Office of the
Director of the National Intelligence: the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Security
Branch, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Office of National Security
Intelligence, Department of Treasury Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of
Energy Office of Intelligence and Counter-intelligence, State Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Army,
Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, and Naval Intelligence. Id. at 9.
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Title 10 Authorities, as amended, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
12
Prevention Act of 2004, the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005, the Protect America Act of 2007, the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
the Attorney General guidelines, Presidential and IC Directives,
Executive Orders, and individual agency policy guidelines. Some
intelligence gathered by these agencies would never be considered
admissible evidence in a United States court; other intelligence could be
introduced, but the evidence would likely never be disclosed in its
original form in order to protect the agencies’ sensitive sources and/or
methods. Thus, intelligence agencies focus on the collection and
dissemination of information as opposed to generating evidence that
13
could be admissible at trial.
Law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, are tasked with
enforcing the laws of the United States and investigating violations of
U.S. laws. These investigations may lead to federal prosecutions, and
therefore, law enforcement agents must gather information that would
be admissible in a court of law. Law enforcement agencies, which are
governed by a different set of statutes and directives than the IC, collect
14
evidence to admit at trial.
Prior to the passage of the U.S.A PATRIOT Act on October 25,
2001, intelligence personnel were unable to share information with law
enforcement personnel about mutual targets of interest whom were
being investigated by their respective agencies but for different reasons,
i.e., national security concerns versus prosecution of criminal offenders.
Now, the wall no longer exists between these two different
15
communities. Intelligence agencies have been asked to share their
12

6 U.S.C. § 485 (2010).
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 6 (“The IC’s mission is to
identify and assess violent extremist groups; warn of impending attacks; and develop precise
intelligence to cut off these groups’ financial support and to disrupt, dismantle, or defeat
their operations.”).
14
For example, in August 2007, Congress passed the Protect America Act which
allowed the intelligence community to conduct surveillance directed at foreign intelligence
targets located in foreign countries without a court order. Protect America Act, Pub. L. No.
110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2007). Whereas, law enforcement agencies must work within the
confines of the U.S. Constitution and criminal statutes, such as the federal wiretap
procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22, which require a court order and lengthy
affidavit and application in order to receive authorization for the interception of wire, oral,
or electronic communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006).
15
50 U.S.C. § 403-5d (2006) (allowing the disclosure of “foreign intelligence
information obtained as part of a criminal investigation” to any federal law enforcement,
13
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information with law enforcement to assist in their pre- and post16
indictment investigations.
Since September 11, 2001, and the
introduction thereafter of the USA PATRIOT Act, more intelligence
information is being generated on common targets of both intelligence
and law enforcement agencies (whether or not law enforcement is aware
17
of the parallel investigation). This increase in single and dual
collection of intelligence material has created a plethora of material that
may be relevant to a criminal defendant’s case. In most instances, the
intent behind the intelligence collection effort was not for the purpose of
developing evidence for trial but rather to provide actionable and
relevant information on terrorists and national security targets to the IC.
The government has greatly increased the number of terrorism and
18
espionage cases being presented for trial in federal courts. As more
intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national security official to assist
in the performance of official duties); 50 U.S.C. § 1806(k)(1) (2010) (“Federal officers who
conduct electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information under [Title 50]
may consult with Federal law enforcement officers . . .”); DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO.
5240.01 § 4.5 (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/
524001p.pdf (discussing the Defense Intelligence and Counterintelligence components’
“affirmative responsibility to share collected and stored information, data, and resulting
analysis with . . . civilian law enforcement officials, as appropriate.”); NAT’L SEC. DIV.,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2008) [hereinafter
PROGRESS REPORT], available at www.justice.gov/nsd/docs/2008/nsd-progress-rpt-2008.pdf
(stating that the passage of the USA Patriot Act [Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001] on
October 25, 2001 “lower[ed] the ‘wall’ that had prevented intelligence personnel and law
enforcement personnel from coordinating and sharing information about the terrorists and
other national security targets they had in common.”).
16
The Department of Justice’s National Security Division was established on
September 28, 2006, which led to a significant increase in the amount of terrorism and
espionage prosecutions across the country in various United States Attorneys’ Offices.
Unlike in the pre-PATRIOT Act era, prosecutors can now play central roles in
the investigations of our national security targets. This operational role in threat
investigations is a tremendous advantage over the days when the ‘wall’ kept
prosecutors in the dark. It gives investigators access to real-time legal advice on
criminal matters as they conduct an intelligence investigation; at the same time
it gives prosecutors insight into the investigation that allows them to develop
evidence for criminal charges that may become necessary to incapacitate a
suspect before he undertakes a terrorist attack.
PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
17
See Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/05/AR2005110501366.htm
l.
18
See Daphne Eviatar, New Report Reaffirms Federal Courts Can Handle Most
Terrorism Cases, WASH. INDEP., (July 23, 2009), http://washingtonindependent.com
/52434/new-report-reaffirms-federal-courts-can-handle-most-terrorism-cases.
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terrorists and espionage subjects are tried in criminal courts, there has
been a corresponding increase in the use of intelligence agencies’
19
classified files being introduced as evidence in criminal proceedings.
However, disclosure of classified information to unauthorized personnel
could result in the exposure and loss of valuable sources and methods
which are vital to national security. Intelligence material which may be
relevant to a criminal prosecution may be too sensitive and valuable to
the IC, and its use in a criminal case could jeopardize its value to the IC.
Prosecutors may learn, quite unexpectedly, about the existence of
intelligence material that was never contemplated as having evidentiary
significance prior to trial. Once a prosecutor becomes aware that
intelligence material exists which may or may not be discoverable, other
considerations such as discovery become a concern. The dilemma in all
cases is the same: what disclosure is required to fulfill discovery
20
obligations and when and in what form to disclose such information.
The answer to these questions should lie in CIPA. However, many
of CIPA’s provisions have provided a skeletal infrastructure but
relatively little substantive guidance to courts, leaving judges to set
forth differing standards on classified information’s use, relevance, and
admissibility at trial. Several courts choose language and analysis from
earlier CIPA court decisions to support their own particular analysis
(which is certainly expected based upon our common law roots). CIPA
case-law is filled with a variety of language evaluating whether the
21
classified information at issue is: “relevant and helpful to the defense,”
22
“essential to a fair determination of a cause,” useful “to counter the
19

With the passage of the USA Patriot Act, criminal investigators now have access to
foreign intelligence information. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31377, THE
USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 8-10 (2002), available at
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31377.pdf. See also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001). Intelligence and criminal investigations now are coordinated – the “wall”
has been eliminated. I can say, on a personal note, the amount of discovery requests sent by
prosecutors to agencies dealing in foreign intelligence has skyrocketed since the passage of
the Patriot Act in 2001.
20
The discovery obligations of federal prosecutors are generally established by several
sources. Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972).
21
. United States v. Garey, No. 5:03-CR-83, 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 23477, at *5 (M.D.
Ga. Nov. 15, 2004).
22
United States v. Abu-jihaad, No. 3:07-CR-57 (MRK), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7653,
at *11 (D. Conn. Feb. 4, 2008) (quoting United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 472 (4th
Cir. 2004)).
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23

government’s case or to bolster a defense,” “material to the preparation
24
of the defense,” or “favorable to the defense that meets the appropriate
25
standard of materiality.”
The Military Commissions Act of 2009, signed into law on
October 28, 2009, uses CIPA only as a starting point to act as a
guideline for military judges when deciding on the use, relevance, and
26
admissibility of classified information during a military trial. The
Military Commissions Act, section 1802, followed most of CIPA’s
27
provisions while adding greater detail for judges to consider. The
revisions to CIPA, which are being used by military courts, provide
further example of the need to update these provisions, resolve the
issues that have arisen since its enactment, and provide more concrete
guidance to the courts.

23
United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993)).
24
United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 & n.25 (D.D.C. 2006).
25
United States v. Mohamed, 410 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 774-75 (9th Cir. 1980)).
26
Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 1801-07, 123 Stat. 2190,
2574-2614 (2009).
27
Id. According to the Military Commissions Act of 2009,
the military judge may not authorize the discovery of or access to such
classified information unless the military judge determines that such classified
information would be noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to a legally
cognizable defense, rebuttal of the prosecution’s case, or to sentencing, in
accordance with standards generally applicable to discovery of or access to
classified information in Federal criminal cases.
Id. §1802, 123 Stat. at 2592 (similar to CIPA section 4 hearings).Under the provision of the
Act similar to CIPA section 6(a) hearings, “[c]lassified information is not subject to
disclosure under this section unless the information is relevant and necessary to an element
of the offense or a legally cognizable defense and is otherwise admissible in evidence.” Id. §
1802, 123 Stat. at 2594. Under another provision,
the military judge shall permit trial counsel to introduce the evidence, including
a substituted evidentiary foundation pursuant to the procedures described in
subsection (d), while protecting from disclosure information identifying those
sources, methods, or activities, if - (A) the evidence is otherwise admissible;
and (B) the military judge finds that (i) the evidence is reliable; and (ii) the
redaction is consistent with affording the accused a fair trial.
Id. § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2594-95.The “statement, summary, or other procedure or redaction”
must “provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his defense as
would disclosure of the specified classified information.” Id. § 1802, 123 Stat. at 2595. No
military commission has prosecuted a detainee as of yet, so the new rules as to the
admissibility of classified material have not begun to be tested.
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III. FROM 1980 TO 2010: SUGGESTED REVISIONS TO CIPA
Congress made clear that CIPA was meant as a procedural tool so
that the defendant would be made aware before trial of any classified
28
information that may be used during trial. Congress divided the
handling of classified information matters into two stages — (1) use
during discovery (section 4) and (2) use at trial (section 6). CIPA should
include guidelines which judges can follow in either context.
A. Current Procedure under CIPA Section 4 and Subsequent Case
Law
Section 4 of CIPA’s applies when a defendant is unaware of the
classified information, and the prosecutor does not want to disclose such
information during discovery (and is requesting a protective order) or
29
wants to disclose the information in a substituted form. Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1), which governs discovery in general,
and CIPA section 4 are interrelated and together essentially state that
the government may submit this classified information, ex parte and in
30
camera, to the court for a pre-trial ruling on its discoverability. CIPA
section 4 authorizes the government to file a written motion requesting
either a protective order prohibiting disclosure of the classified
information or the granting of a partial redaction/substitution/summary
31
of the classified materials at issue. The language in CIPA section 4 is
straightforward, simply stating that: “[t]he court may permit the United
States to make a request for such authorization in the form of a written
32
statement to be inspected by the court alone.”
Congress provided no guidance as to how judges should decide
28
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 10, 94 Stat. 2025, 2029
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16).
29
Id. § 4.
30
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 (d)(1). Rule 16(d)(1) authorizes the court to issue orders that
“deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection.” Id. Rule 16 also permits a party’s written
motion on the matter be inspected ex parte. Id.
31
Substitution is permitted under CIPA section 4:
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete
specified items of classified information from documents to be made available
to the defendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information for such classified
documents, or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the
classified information would tend to prove.
Classified Information Procedures Act § 4.
32
Id.
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whether the classified information at issue should be protected, whether
it should be substituted, or whether it should be disclosed in its original
form. In fact, Congress, in many of its legislative documents, stated that
judges should follow the current rules of evidence when making these
33
determinations and should not alter the existing rules. This led judges
to create their own guidelines.
Prior to issuing a protective order or ordering a substitution, many
34
courts have considered whether the classified material is “relevant”
35
and “helpful or material to the defense.” The D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Mejia, created its own three-part analysis in determining
36
whether classified information should be disclosed to the defense.
First, the reviewing court must find that the information “crosses the
low hurdle of relevance”; second, “‘the assertion of privilege by the
government [must be] a colorable one’”; and third, the “classified
information is not discoverable on a mere showing of theoretical
relevance . . . the threshold for discovery in this context further requires
that [the information be] . . . at least ‘helpful to the defense of [the]
37
accused.’” Other courts have stated that the classified information to be
disclosed must be “‘relevant and helpful to the defense’ or ‘essential to
38
a fair determination of a cause,’” should be “both material and
33

H.R. Rep. NO. 96-1436, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4310; H.R.
Rep. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 11 (1980); H.R. Rep. NO. 96-831, pt. 2, at 3 (1980).
34
See United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that
when the court reviews CIPA issues, it must use existing standards for determining
relevancy).
35
A definition of “helpful to the defense” is found in: United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d
617, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Yunis, an informant had gained the confidence of defendant
Yunis, who was later charged with air piracy, and overseas conversations between the
informant and defendant relating to his eventual criminal charges were intercepted through
classified methods. Id. at 618. The government moved to protect these conversations from
disclosure; the district court ordered that the materials be produced in a redacted version. Id.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that the government’s interest in nondisclosure was great,
and that the taped conversations were not “helpful to the defense”: “[n]othing in the
classified documents in fact goes to the innocence of the defendant vel non, impeaches any
evidence of guilt, or makes more or less probable any fact at issue in establishing any
defense to the charges.” Id. at 624.
36
United States v. Mejia, 448 F.3d 436, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
37
Id. In Mejia, a government filter team, without the knowledge of the prosecution
team, sought and received a protective order precluding discovery to the defense of certain
classified matters that were arguably within the scope of discovery. Id. at 454. The D.C.
Circuit concluded that after examining the classified material at issue, it fell short of the
“helpful or beneficial character” necessary to meet the threshold showing for overcoming
the privilege.” Id. at 456 (citing Yunis, 867 F.2d at 624).
38
United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d 786, 801 (E.D. Va. 2007).
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39

favorable to [the] defense,” and should not be “merely cumulative nor
40
corroborative . . . nor speculative.”
Not only have courts asked whether the material is relevant and
“helpful to the defense” in determining its discoverability, but various
courts have also applied a balancing test to the analysis by weighing a
defendant’s right to obtain certain classified information against the
government’s claim of privilege regarding non-disclosure based upon
national security concerns and its need to prevent the compromise of
41
intelligence sources and methods. The courts borrowed this balancing
test from the government’s informant privilege set forth in Roviaro v.
42
United States. In Roviaro, the United States Supreme Court considered
the application of the informant’s privilege to the general discovery
rules, pursuant to which the government may withhold the identity of its
43
informants from disclosure . The Court noted that the privilege
implicates two fundamental competing interests: (1) the interest of the
defendant in mounting a defense; and (2) the public interest in enabling
44
the government to protect its sources. The Court relied on two basic
39

United States v. Paracha, No. 03 CR. 1197, 2006 WL 12768, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3,

2006).
40
United States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal citations
omitted).
41
See United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that “[o]n
issues of discovery [of classified information], the court can engage in balancing.”).
42
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). See also United States v. Aref, 533
F.3d 72, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2008) (adopting the “Roviaro standard for determining when the
Government’s privilege must give way in a CIPA case”); United States v. Van Horn, 789
F.2d 1492, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Roviaro principle applied and that
disclosure of both the nature and location of electronic surveillance equipment would
merely serve to educate criminals on how to protect themselves from detection); Smith, 780
F.2d at 1108-10 (although this case was decided under CIPA section 6, it relied upon CIPA
section 4 case-law and held that the principles espoused in Roviaro were applicable to the
assessment of the government’s need to maintain the secrecy of the sources and methods of
foreign intelligence gathering for national security purposes. “Law enforcement domestic
informers generally know who their enemies are; intelligence agents ofttimes do not. To
give the domestic informer of the police more protection than the foreign informer of the
CIA seems to us to place the security of the nation from foreign danger on a lower plane
than the security of the nation from the danger from domestic criminals.”); see also United
States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 307-08 (finding that the standard set forth in Roviaro
must be applied in determining whether the government’s privilege in protecting classified
information should prevail, and this determination takes into consideration whether the
information is “relevant and helpful to the defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination
of a cause” ).
43
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 55.
44
Id. at 62.
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45

principles to resolve the competing interests. First, it noted that the
defendant’s interest was triggered only when information in the
46
government’s possession was “relevant and helpful.” Second, when the
evidence is deemed relevant and helpful, the Court held that resolving
the interests “calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the
flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his
47
defense.”
While Congress never specifically stated whether a balancing test
should be applied in determining the disclosure of classified
information, Congress did comment that “the protection of information
vital to the national security” should be taken into account by the court
in deciding on whether to permit discovery to be “denied, restricted or
48
deferred.” Thus, several courts have held that even if a defendant is
able to show that information is both relevant and helpful to the defense,
overriding national security concern may, on balance, trump the
49
defendant’s need for the information.
B. Current Procedure under CIPA Section 6 and Subsequent Case
Law
CIPA section 6 applies when a defendant or the government wants
50
to utilize classified information at trial. In such cases, a pre-trial
hearing is held during which a determination is first made whether the
51
classified information is admissible, and later, in what form it may be
52
introduced. A CIPA section 6 hearing, usually involving both the
45

Id.
Id. at 60-2.
47
Id. at 62.
48
S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4300.
49
United States v. Sarkissian, 841 F.2d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 426-27 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Rahman, 870 F. Supp. 47,
52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); cf. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 168 (2d Cir. 2003)
(finding no error in preventing disclosure of statements of the defendant where the materials
contained no exculpatory information in order to protect, in part, “the need for secrecy about
how [the government] investigates and responds to terrorist threats.”); United States v.
Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 1978) (affirming protective order to deny disclosure of
voice recordings to protect cooperating witnesses and because “the tapes contained no
exculpatory evidence and the fact that the Government made no direct or derivative use of
the tapes...”).
50
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16).
51
Id. § 6(a).
52
Id. § 6(c).
46
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53

defendant and the prosecution, can be held in camera when the
government certifies in its motion requesting a hearing that a public
54
proceeding might result in the compromise of classified information.
CIPA section 6(b) explains that the government must give notice of the
classified information at issue to the defendant prior to the hearing
either by providing the defendant with the specific material, or
generically categorizing the materials (if the defendant has not had
55
access to them). Under section 6(a), judges are to “make all
determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of
classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial or
56
pre-trial proceeding.” If the judge determines the classified material is
admissible, the government can then request under section 6(c) that the
classified material be substituted and entered into evidence in the form
57
of a “statement” or “summary.” This substitution must place the
defendant in “substantially the same ability to make his defense as
58
would disclosure of the specific classified information.” Along with its
request for substitution, the government can attach an affidavit
“certifying that disclosure of classified information would cause
identifiable damage to the national security of the United States and
59
explaining the basis for the classification of such information.”
As stated previously when discussing the procedures set forth
under section 4, Congress did not address which standard the courts
should use at a section 6 hearing to determine all the issues regarding
the “use, relevancy, or admissibility” of classified information at pretrial
60
or trial proceedings. Most courts’ determinations on use, relevance,
and admissibility are made according to Federal Rules of Evidence 401,
61
402, and 403. However, the Fourth Circuit has conducted the same
53

The defendant can be excluded during a section 6 hearing during which questions of
law are resolved. United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1261-62 (9th Cir.
1998).
54
Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(b).
55
Id.
56
Id. § 6(a).
57
Id. § 6(c)(1).
58
Id.
59
Id. at § 6(c)(2).
60
Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(a).
61
See United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir. 1984) (where the court first
determined relevancy under Fed. R. Evid. 401, then determining whether the evidence was
“prejudicial, confusing, or misleading” so that it should be excluded under Fed. R. Evid.
403); see also United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (where the court

REID (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

5/5/2011 7:33 PM

285

Roviaro balancing of interests test used in section 4 hearings to
determine the admissibility of classified information at trial during a
62
section 6 hearing. Once courts determine the classified material’s
relevancy and admissibility, they have then used their own discretion,
taking into account the government’s reasons for substitution, on a caseby-case basis as to whether the government’s proposed substitution is
63
appropriate.
Congress has made it clear that courts should not evaluate
64
substitutions so as to require “precise, concrete equivalence.” Instead,
according to the Fourth Circuit, the courts should consider whether
receiving the summary rather than the specific classified information
65
will “materially disadvantage the defendant.” Thus, “the fact that
insignificant tactical advantages could accrue to the defendant by the
use of the specific classified information should not preclude the court
from” authorizing disclosure of the information in the form of a
66
substitution. The D.C. Circuit has stated that a summary should not be
rejected simply because the defense could argue that it lacks the
“evidentiary richness” or “narrative integrity” of the classified
67
information in its original form. The contextual information behind the
classified material at issue is precisely the type of information that the
government most wishes to protect; frequently, “the government’s
security interest . . . lies not so much in the contents of [a]
conversation[], as in the time, place, and nature of the government’s
68
ability to intercept the conversation[] at all.”
Courts have been creative in devising and approving substitutions;
they have allowed the government to hide the classified nature of a
applied a materiality standard); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1984)
(concluding that “the district court correctly found this evidence inadmissible under the
ordinary rules of evidence separate and apart from any CIPA consideration...”); see also
United States v. Libby, 453 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39, 44 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying the Federal
Rules of Evidence for relevance, admissibility, and general use).
62
See U.S. v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059, 1065-66 (4th Cir. 1987) (remanding to allow
government assertion of Roviaro privilege in CIPA section 6(a) relevance hearing); United
States v. Smith, 780 F.2d 1102, 1106-08 (4th Cir. 1985).
63
See United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying an abuse
of discretion standard to lower court’s ruling on one such substitution).
64
H.R. Rep. NO. 96-1436, at 12-13 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4310.
65
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 477 (4th Cir. 2004).
66
H.R. Rep. NO. 96-1436, at 12-13 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4310.
67
United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing Old Chief v.
United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 651 (1997)).
68
United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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document by placing the content into another document that is
discoverable, or creating a document, such as an agent’s report, that
69
contains the content but not the context of the classified document.
Substitutions also come in the form of agreed-upon stipulations; instead
of a classified document being introduced as evidence, the content of
the document is read to the jury in the form of a stipulation with an
70
accompanying jury instruction explaining why. Courts also admit
71
classified documents into evidence in a redacted form. In order to
avoid witness testimony of classified information at trial, a witness’
testimony can be prepared in a question-and-answer format which can
72
then be read into the record at trial. When defense counsel wants to
impeach a witness based upon their prior statements (which are
classified), a summary of the prior statements rather than original
73
statements themselves can be read to the jury. In United States v. Abu
Marzook, foreign agents had requested that their identities not be
disclosed based upon their nation’s security interest; the court closed the
courtroom but provided live video to a separate courtroom where the
witnesses were heard but not seen, and were permitted to testify under
74
pseudonyms. Another interesting method of substitution is what is
known as the “silent witness rule”:
[T]he witness would not disclose the information from the classified
document in open court. Instead, the witness would have a copy of
the classified document before him. The court, counsel and the jury
would also have copies of the classified document. The witness
would refer to specific places in the document in response to
69

See United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1442 (D.D.C. 1989) (holding that
substitutions in the form of government admissions contained in a forty-four page document
were sufficient in lieu of specified classified information).
70
United States v. Salah, 462 F. Supp. 2d 915, 917-24 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (allowing
substitutions/government admissions to be read to the jury that neither the government nor
the witness could contradict); United States v. Marzook, 435 F. Supp. 2d 708, 749 (N.D. Ill.
2006) (approving such stipulations).
71
United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 220 (4th Cir. 2009).
72
CIPA section 8 (c) permits “the United States to provide the court with a proffer of
the witness’ response to the question or line of inquiry” and require “the defendant to
provide the court with a proffer of the nature of the information he seeks to elicit.”
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 8(c), 94 Stat. 2025, 2029
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16). In United States v. Mohamed, 410 F.
Supp. 2d 913, 918 (S.D. Cal. 2003), the court considered defendant’s proffered crossexamination questions of a classified matter which would be asked of a witness verbatim
during trial.
73
United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566, 577-78 (7th Cir. 2005).
74
United States v. Abu Marzook, 412 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923, 925-28 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
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questioning. The jury would then refer to the particular part of the
document as the witness answered. By this method, the classified
information would not be made public at trial but the defense would
75
be able to present that classified information to the jury.

Generally, as long as the substitution places the defendant in
“substantially the same ability to make his defense,” the trial will go on.
76
What the judge determines to be an adequate substitution is another
77
story.
C. A Proposed Guideline to be Followed in Section 4 and 6
Hearings
Congress set procedures in place in 1980 so that defendants and
prosecutors must notify each other prior to trial that they intended to
utilize classified material during trial, similar to the requirement that the
78
defendant give notice of an alibi, insanity, or public authority defense.
Congress set up the procedures to be followed in the section 4 and
75

U.S. v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059, 1063 (4th Cir. 1987). However, the Rosen court stated
that a silent witness ought to be used only when the government establishes that: (1) there is
“an overriding reason for closing the trial”; (2) “the closure is no broader than necessary to
protect that interest”; (3) “no reasonable alternatives exist”; and (4) the defendant is
provided with “substantially the same ability” to make his defense as he would had there
been a full disclosure of the classified information. United States v. Rosen, 520 F. Supp. 2d
786, 799 (E.D. Va. 2007) (citing Press Enter. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501
(1984)).
76
Classified Information Procedures Act § 6(c)(1).
77
See United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1442, 1443 (D.D.C. 1989) (finding that a
substitution containing admissions of fact by the United States provided the defendant with
substantially the same ability to make his defense as afforded by the disclosure of the
specified classified information); see also United States v. Salah, 462 F. Supp. 2d 915, 91820 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (finding substitutions provided the defendant with facts he could argue to
the jury in the same vein as if he had been provided use of the classified information);
United States v. Poindexter, 732 F. Supp. 165, 170 (D.D.C. 1990) (ordering videotape
edited to exclude the portions which contained sensitive information be made available to
the press and public). But see also United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that the government’s proposed substitution would “decrease the
reasonableness of the [defendant’s] belief that the government approved his activities,”
where the defendant attempted to argue that he transported firearms to Afghan rebels in
reliance upon United States officials’ statements that led him to believe he was lawfully
transporting guns).
78
See Classified Information Procedures Act § 5; FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (Notice of Alibi
Defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2 (Notice of an Insanity Defense); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3
(Notice of a Public Authority Defense); see also H.R. Rep. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 22 (1980)
(The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence discussed “the issue of reciprocity, i.e.,
what advance disclosures the government should make to the defendant because of the
advance notice the defendant is required to provide the government.”).
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section 6 context, but failed to take into consideration what standards
should be used. While aware that the discovery phase is different from
79
the admissibility phase, I believe one set of guidelines could be
80
followed in either situation. These guidelines would do away with the
81
court’s use of the balancing test in both the section 4 and 6 context and
79
Criminal discovery is essentially governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rule 16), while the admissibility of evidence at trial is governed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
80
Some critics may argue that there should be two different guidelines applicable to
CIPA section 4 (discovery) and CIPA section 6 (admissibility) hearings because different
federal rules apply at the discovery and admissibility stages. I believe one guideline can be
utilized in section 4 and section 6 (use, relevance, admissibility) hearings, and substitutions
can be considered at either of these hearings. At their core, the federal rules on discovery
and evidentiary federal rules evaluate the classified information at issue in the same light: is
the particular item “relevant” to the case . The Federal Rules of Evidence take items turned
over in discovery one step further: is this item admissible at trial/have the necessary
evidentiary foundations been met? CIPA allows for a perversion of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in the sense that it permits substitutions: where an item may have been
discoverable but not admissible, the item can now become admissible in its substituted
form. This can benefit either the government or the defense — depending upon which party
is now able to introduce evidence (inculpatory, exculpatory, impeaching, etc.) that might not
have been admissible in its original form. This places the discovery and admissibility phases
on an equal playing field — at both stages the court is interested in “relevancy” rather than
whether an evidentiary foundation exists to admit the item as evidence. Thus, utilizing the
same set of guidelines for discoverability and admissibility in the classified information
context is acceptable as the substitution crafted during a CIPA section 4 or CIPA section 6
hearing is outside the norm of the regular rules of evidence, and the rules regarding
discoverability and admissibility both rely on the same standards of “relevancy.”
81
This guideline would have judges evaluate the reasons why the government believes
a national security interest exists to protect the information only after establishing the
material’s relevance to the criminal case. Therefore, the judge would determine whether the
material falls under the discovery rules and then evaluate the government’s national security
reasons before issuing a protective order, permitting a substitution, or ordering the material
be presented in its original form. In the admissibility context, the judge would follow the
same methodology — determining whether the material is relevant utilizing the Federal
Rules of Evidence and then evaluating the government’s reasons as to why disclosure would
cause damage to national security before issuing a protective order, permitting a
substitution, or ordering the material be presented in its original form. This guideline
clarifies Congress’ intent that judges, in the CIPA section 6 context, should first determine
the material’s relevance and then determine the government’s national security interest
when determining whether an adequate substitution for the classified information exists.See
S. Rep. No. 96-823, at 9 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4303 (where the
Committee on the Judiciary stated: “It should be emphasized, however, that the court should
not balance the national security interests of the Government against the rights of the
defendant to obtain the information.”). This guideline does not suggest courts should
continue with the established Roviaro balancing test used in CIPA section 4, and sometimes
CIPA section 6, hearings. Judges should take the government’s reasons for classification
into consideration in both sets of hearings after determining whether the material falls under
discovery and evidentiary rules. Whether the judge then subconsciously “balances” the
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replace it with one straightforward set of principles.
First, the court must decide whether the information at issue is
“relevant” within Federal Rules of Evidence 401-403 and Federal Rule
82
of Criminal Procedure 16. Within this determination, the court should
83
evaluate whether the information is exculpatory, usable for
84
85
impeachment, “material to the defense,” or a pretrial statement made
by a government witness related to the subject matter of the witness’s
86
testimony. Second, the court must determine whether the information
material’s relevance and materiality against the government’s reasons for classification —
the fact remains that both prongs should be taken into consideration prior to the judge
arriving at his final decision.
82
The idea of amending section 4 and section 6 so that judges determine relevance first
without taking into account an item’s classified status is nothing new. In 1988, Richard
Salgado suggested that classified information should first determine relevancy in both
section 4 and section 6 situations and then utilize a balancing test to determine whether a
defendant had a compelling need to view the classified material in its original form (rather
than its substituted form). Richard Salgado, Note, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and
CIPA, 98 YALE L.J. 427, 442-46 (1988). While I agree courts should determine relevancy
first, I disagree with the suggestion that judges should continue to use a balancing test under
Roviaro.
83
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In Brady, the Supreme Court held that
the government must provide to the defense any evidence favorable to the accused and
material to guilt or punishment. Id. A violation of this duty is a denial of due process, and a
due process violation may occur irrespective of the good faith of the prosecutor. Id.
84
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). In Giglio, the Supreme Court
held that Brady principles extended to evidence affecting government witnesses’ credibility.
Id.
85
“Material to the defense” has been described as a “reasonable probability” that the
result of the proceeding would have been different had it been disclosed to the defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The Supreme Court defined
“reasonable probability” as “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694). The district court in Yunis found that evidence is “material” if it touches upon “very
crucial issues, such as motive, intent, prejudice, credibility, or even the possibility of
exposing duress or entrapment.” United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
86
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006). In Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 66869 (1957), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant was entitled to the production
of pre-trial oral or written statements of government witnesses if the contents were relevant
to the subject matter of their direct testimony at trial. The Court noted that “only the defense
is adequately equipped to determine the effective use [of such statements] for [the] purpose
of discrediting the Government’s witness[es].” Id. at 668-69. In the Jencks Act, Congress
codified and reaffirmed the holding of the Jencks decision. Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.2 incorporates the Jencks Act, which entitles defendants to discover pretrial
statements of government witnesses after the witness has testified on direct examination if
the statements are in the government’s possession and relate to the subject matter of the
witness’s testimony. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a). In cases in which
classified information is at issue, the pretrial statements (possibly in substituted form) would
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87

has been deemed classified and whether a national security interest
88
exists to protect the information from disclosure.
If both prongs are met, and the classified information is relevant,
but does not fall under Brady, Giglio, or Jencks (cases and statute
outlining discovery obligations of federal prosecutors), and is not
“material to the defense” (meaning the information is inculpatory,
discoverable evidence that neither party wants to use at trial and does
89
not constitute a pretrial statement of a government witness), then the
court should issue a protective order against disclosure and/or
admissibility. But if the classified material is relevant and either falls
under (1) Brady, Giglio, Jencks, or is “material to the defense,” or (2)
the government or defendant wants to use the evidence at trial, then the
court should either (a) create a substitution to be used in discovery and
trial, or (b) if no adequate substitution exists, dismiss the indictment,
dismiss the counts pertaining to the classified information, find against
the United States on any issue to which the classified information
relates, or strike or preclude certain testimony (as expressed in CIPA
section 6(e)(2)).
be turned over in discovery and not after the witness testifies on direct examination. Witness
statements that are subject to discovery include: (1) written statements that are signed or
otherwise adopted or approved by a witness; (2) substantially verbatim recordings or
transcriptions of oral statements; and (3) grand jury testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(1)-(3).
87
Classified information is designated by the Executive Branch to prevent it from being
improperly disclosed to the public. It is an executive function to classify information, and
the President, various agency heads, and government officials have been granted the power
under Executive Orders to classify information. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707
(Dec. 29, 2009). CIPA section 1(a) defines classified information as “any information or
material that has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an
Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure
for reasons of national security and any restricted data, as defined in...the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954...” Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 1(a), 94 Stat.
2025, 2025 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16).
88
Information may be classified, but a national security interest may not exist to protect
the information from disclosure. For example, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713, 714 (1971), the government filed a motion to keep the New York Times from
publishing portions of the Pentagon Papers, a classified historical study on the Vietnam
War. While the Pentagon Papers may have been classified by the government at a “secret”
level, the government failed to show how the disclosure of this report would cause damage
to national security. Id. Although this was a civil case involving the state secrets privilege,
the analysis in determining whether a national security privilege exists is the similar.
89
“[I]nculpatory material which the government does not intend to offer at trial need
not be disclosed. Such information cannot conceivably help a defendant, and therefore is
both unnecessary and useless to him.” United States v. Rahman, 870 F. Supp. 47, 52
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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This guideline takes into account the various scenarios that may
arise in criminal cases concerning classified information. If the
prosecution learns of recordings collected by an intelligence agency,
and the recordings are relevant but inculpatory and cumulative to other
evidence already disclosed to the defense, then the judge should issue a
protective order against disclosure and admissibility of the recordings in
an ex parte section 4 hearing. If parts of those recordings are
exculpatory, and the methods by which the recordings were made
should be protected, then the judge should approve the government’s
substitution (perhaps placing the recordings among non-classified
recordings or summarizing the contents of the recordings in an agent’s
report).
If the defendant worked for the CIA and requests the use of some
classified documents to prove he was working with the CIA at the time
of the alleged illegal conduct in question, and wants to use this material
as part of his public authority defense, the judge should determine the
relevancy of the information and its classified status. If the judge
determines the information to be relevant and classified, he can order
the government to either redact the documents or create a stipulation to
be read at trial.
If the government learns of an intelligence agency source that may
have impeachment material on another government witness who will
testify at trial, the judge must be provided with the pertinent facts that
may bear on the government witness’ credibility. The judge can
determine the veracity of the impeachment material and its classified
status, and order the government to turn over a summary of the
impeachment material. This will allow the defense to utilize that
information in the cross examination of the government witness at issue.
The government will not be permitted to dispute the veracity of the
impeachment material at trial.

REID (DO NOT DELETE)

292

5/5/2011 7:33 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 35:2

If the defendant requests evidence that may be classified but is not
relevant to the case and will not be used at trial, i.e. a Guantanamo Bay
detainee requesting the names of CIA operatives and the locations of
90
secret safe houses, and if the information is not Brady, Giglio, or
“material” to his defense, then the judge should issue a protective order
against disclosure.
IV. CIPA’S ACHILLES HEEL: SECRECY AND SUBSTITUTIONS
A review of various CIPA litigation cases between 1981 and 2009
revealed that defendants (and their defense counsel) had two main
concerns (other than questioning CIPA’s constitutionality): (1) the
overall secrecy surrounding the ex parte process under section 4 leading
to the discoverability (or non-discoverability) of classified material, and
(2) the defendant’s lack of access to classified material in its original
91
form that may relate to his criminal case.
Creating a straightforward set of guidelines that judges should
follow in determining discoverability and admissibility of classified
information at trial would help alleviate a defendant’s concerns. The
overall “secrecy” surrounding this process of discoverability (or nondiscoverability) and admissibility (or non-admissibility) of classified
material as it pertains to criminal cases appears unfavorable to the
92
defense. The biggest concern regarding CIPA is that section 4 allows
90

For example, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, currently awaiting trial in the Southern
District of New York, may request the names of operatives and his interrogators, and the
locations of secret safe houses where he was kept prior to being sent to Guantanamo Bay.
Terry Frieden and Chris Kokenes, Accused 9/11 Plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Faces
New York Trial, CNN (Nov. 13, 2009), www.edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/13
/khalid.sheikh.mohammed.If the government does not intend on using any of Mohammed’s
statements made after his capture in 2003 (which would be wise considering Mohammed
was waterboarded 183 times during interrogations in March 2003 and the statements were
clearly involuntary), then the evidence would not be relevant and would merely serve to
embarrass the government as to its covert terrorist rendition techniques or create a mini-trial
within the trial itself. Id.
91
See generally United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA and FISA in
the Courts, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 1063, 1066-69 (2006). I would also note from my review of
many CIPA-related cases that the greatest complaint by defendants was that they were not
given access to the original form of classified information, that they were not permitted to
disclose their own evidence of a classified nature in its original form to the jury, or that they
did not approve of the government’s proposed substitution.
92
See Yaroshefsky, supra note 91, 1068-69 (2006) (criticizing the secrecy surrounding
pre-trial ex parte hearings under CIPA section 4 and the government’s ability to create
substitutions without the defendant’s knowledge).
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for an ex parte hearing between the judge and prosecutor during which
the judge decides whether the classified information should be disclosed
93
to the defendant and if so, in what form. Critics argue that the defense
counsel should be granted a security clearance and be permitted to
94
attend and argue as his client’s sole advocate at such a hearing.
However, demanding that defense counsel receive a briefing on all
classified information that arises in every criminal case defeats the
government’s purpose in classifying certain material; limiting the
number of people aware of both the sensitive sources and methods the
95
government utilizes. The few people who “need to know” are those
who require this information in order to effectively carry out their job
96
function. A defense counsel can effectively represent his client without
knowing the sensitive sources and/or methods used by the government
to collect a particular piece of evidence. Substitutions can be created by
the judge so that defense counsel can have access to the content and be
excluded only from the context. Since substitutions are admitted into
97
evidence without the necessary evidentiary foundations, the context

93
Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 4, 94 Stat. 2025, 202526 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16).
94
See Yaroshefsky, supra note 92, at 1086; see also In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S.
Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 93, 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion when it restricted access to classified information to defense who
qualified for security clearances but denied access to the defendants who did not possess
security clearances); United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1087 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(stating that any infirmities were cured by the requirement that the government provide
discovery to cleared counsel where the defendant objected to the government’s ability to file
CIPA motions ex parte); United States v. Chalmers, No. S5 05 Cr. 59(DC), 2007 WL
591948, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (prohibiting cleared defense counsel from disclosing
classified information to their clients); cf. United States v. Amawi, No. 3:06CR719, 2009
WL 961143, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (holding that a security clearance without a “need to
know,” “does not . . . entitle counsel to see anything and everything that the government has
stamped classified even if it has something to do with a client” where defense counsel
obtained security clearances and moved to obtain copies of CIPA materials).
95
“National security” is defined in CIPA as “the national defense and foreign relations
of the United States.” Classified Information Procedures Act § 1(b).
96
A person requesting access to classified information must have an appropriate
security clearance, sign an approved nondisclosure agreement, and have “a need-to-know
the information.” Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 720 (Dec. 29, 2009).
97
26 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Evid. § 5672.
Substitutions are just that, substitutions in an unclassified and modified form, so they alter
the best evidence rule normally required for admissibility during trial. Whereas the evidence
in its original form would have been entered using the normal evidentiary foundations, now
the judge is permitting admission of the substitutions without the need for usual necessary
evidentiary foundations in its original form.

REID (DO NOT DELETE)

294

5/5/2011 7:33 PM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

Vol. 35:2

should be irrelevant. As more classified information touches upon
criminal cases including those not directly linked to terrorism or
espionage, more and more defendants will demand disclosure. If strict
guidelines, as discussed above, are incorporated into CIPA sections 4
and 6, then defendants can be assured that appropriate procedures are
followed.
In some instances, such as at the discovery phase during section 4
ex parte hearings, defense counsel will not be aware of the evidence
98
generated by sensitive sources or methods. It is in these instances that
the judge should function not only as a neutral arbiter as he does during
trial, but also serve as the defendant’s advocate at such a hearing. In
these ex parte hearings, judges should act as defense counsel and
thoroughly evaluate the relevancy of the classified material, the
government’s need to protect its sources and methods, and the
defendant’s need for access to this information. Judges should also
scrutinize proposed substitutions to ensure they accurately summarize
the classified information’s content. The judge’s role in this process is
critical as the government has been criticized in the past for over99
classifying documents that do not require protection. Some classified
documents can be revealed without compromising sensitive methods or
sources or causing harm to national security. Some classified

98

Classified Information Procedures Act § 6.
See Yaroshefsky, supra note 92, at 1081 (citing the New York Times and arguing that
the executive branch is “notorious for over-classification” of documents and that the Bush
administration doubled the number of documents that were labeled as classified). In
response to the either actual or perceived amount of over-classification of documents,
President Obama signed a new Executive Order 13,526 on December 29, 2009, § 1.9(a) of
which requires agencies to perform “a comprehensive review” of its internal classification
guides and “identify classified information that no longer requires protection and can be
declassified.” Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.9(a), 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 712 (Dec. 29, 2009). The
new Executive Order also includes the establishment of a National Declassification Center
to coordinate and streamline the declassification process (§ 3.7 (a)) and clearly states in §
1.5(d) that “[n]o information may remain classified indefinitely.” The Order also states that
the executive branch wanted to establish a “uniform system” to classify and declassify
national security information in order to “protect[] information critical to our Nation’s
security and demonstrate[] our commitment to open Government through accurate and
accountable application of classification standards and routine, secure, and effective
declassification.” Id. Moreover, the House passed a bill on February 3, 2009. H.R. 553,
111th Cong. (as passed by House on Feb. 3, 2009). The new law “require[s] the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a strategy to prevent the over-classification of homeland
security and other information and to promote the sharing of unclassified homeland security
and other information.” Reducing Over-Classification Act, Pub. L. No. 111-258, 124 Stat.
2648 (2010).
99
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information may merely cause embarrassment to the government if
disclosed to the public. Once defendants and their counsel place greater
confidence in the judge’s role as their advocate in ex parte situations
and become more familiar with the strict guidelines a judge must follow
in these matters, they will begin to experience less frustration with the
100
overall secrecy of the process.
Another potential concern for defendants is access to classified
information only in its substituted form, rather than in its original form.
Defendants may argue that a substitution will only put a defendant in a
substantially similar position if the defendant and defense counsel are
able to evaluate the material in its original form. This argument only
applies in section 4 hearings and shows little faith in the judges who
100
Currently, there is no requirement under CIPA section 4 to notify the defendant that
a section 4 hearing took place. Rather, the pleadings, the court’s protective order, and the
record of the hearing are made available to the appellate court for review if an appeal is later
filed. However, U.S. Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-Maryland), former Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee, reintroduced legislation,
S. 354, in the Senate on February 15, 2011, proposing that CIPA section 4 be changed to
require that the United States “provide the defendant and the appellate court with a written
notice setting forth each date that the United States obtained a protective order under
[CIPA]” once the defendant is convicted and files a notice of appeal. S. 354, 112th Cong. §
3 (2011). Senator Cardin stated that he wanted to “ensure that the statute [referring to the
presumably new and improved CIPA statute] maintains the proper balance between the
protection of classified sources, methods and information, and a defendant’s constitutional
rights.” 157 Cong. Rec. S753 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Benjamin L.
Cardin). If CIPA section 4 is changed so that all parties are notified that a CIPA section 4 ex
parte hearing took place, this will create a slippery slope — defendants and prosecutors (in
some cases) will demand to not only know of the existence of the hearing but will also
demand to review all classified materials involved in the hearing. This will result in a flood
of litigation in matters that have no bearing on the defendant’s case. At the point the
defendant will be notified, the district court judge will have already reviewed the
information and made a determination under section 4 that the material was not relevant to
the defendant’s case and issued a protective order. Most classified information reviewed at
CIPA section 4 ex parte hearings is inculpatory and not intended to be used at trial. Thus,
defendants would have no reason to be notified. If the classified information reviewed is
Brady, Giglio, Jencks, or material to the defense, then judges should be trusted to make the
appropriate substitutions/disclosures. Moreover, if defendants and defense counsel were
permitted to review all classified materials involved in Section 4 hearings, this could create
serious repercussions within the IC who cooperate with federal prosecutors on discovery
issues knowing that the classified material in its original form will be protected (and only
reviewed by judges and prosecutors). The IC would be asked to disclose all classified
information in federal criminal cases even when the prosecution does not intend on using
the classified information against the defendant. In a sense, every defendant who has had
contact with the IC in whatever shape or form would know of intelligence information
collected on him/her if he/she is ever prosecuted in a federal criminal court in a wholly
different matter. This proposed change could negatively impact the fragile relationship
between the IC and law enforcement/federal prosecutors.
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have evaluated the content in its original context and determined the
content in the substituted format to be substantially similar. The
underlying issue for defendants is the fact that they cannot use the
original format (witness, document, recording, or otherwise) at trial
before the jury (a summary/stipulation/ prepared question-and-answer
format versus live testimony, surprise cross examination, or asking
questions into the government’s controversial sources and methods
behind the evidence at issue). Substitutions do have advantages — the
defense has no doubt that the evidence will be admitted at trial, and if
the substitution is a stipulation, it can have a powerful effect on juries as
101
joint stipulations are seen as facts “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Little
can be gained by the defense attempting to identify the original source
of the classified information to be admitted at trial other than, perhaps,
keeping the focus of the jury away from the true purpose of the trial —
determining whether the prosecution has proven all elements of the
102
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accompanying jury instructions
103
are also critical to the success of substitutions used at trial.
In
101
See
Should
You
Stipulate?,
Trial
Theater
(Aug.
26,
2007),
www.trialtheater.com/wordpress/general-trial-strategies/should-you-stipulate. Stipulating to
evidentiary foundations in order to eliminate the need to disclose classified sources or
methods, or allowing a witness to provide a narrative response to direct and cross
examination questions previously crafted at a section 6 hearing should not negatively affect
a defendant’s case. In fact, by stipulating to these issues, defense attorneys can streamline
their case and focus on the important issues in dispute. Id.
102
For example, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s request for the names of CIA operatives
and his interrogators, the locations of secret safe houses where he was kept, and the names
of Guantanamo Bay detainees who will testify to his confessions while detained would, if
the government did not intend on utilizing any statements of his once in custody, result in
keeping the focus away from the evidence intended to be used at trial and cause the trial to
be about government embarrassment, CIA interrogation techniques, torture, kidnapping, etc.
Frieden & Kokenes, supra note 90.
103
It may be necessary for the court to deliver an instruction to the jury during trial
explaining why portions of a document admitted into evidence were redacted, why only a
part of a document was admitted, or why a witness curtailed his/her response to a question
during direct or cross-examination. United States v. Salah provides the following example:
This case involves certain classified information. Classified information is
information or material that has been determined by the United States
Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure. In lieu of disclosing specific
classified information, I anticipate that you will hear certain substitutions for the
classified information during this trial. These substitutions are admissions of
relevant facts by the United States for purposes of this trial. The witnesses in
this case as well as attorneys are prohibited from disclosing classified
information and, in the case of the attorneys, are prohibited from asking
questions to any witness which if answered would disclose classified
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situations where a witness’ testimony must be given in the form of a
proffered statement, rather than in question-and-answer format for
reasons of national security, the judge must make clear that the jury
should not infer from this form of testimony that the defendant is a
threat to national security. Rather, they should infer that the government
is attempting to protect its sources and methods by crafting a statement
for the witness which highlights all pertinent facts but avoids an
inadvertent disclosure of classified information. The judge must ensure
that the defendant is placed in a similar position as if he had the
information in its original form. A stipulation or prepared witness
statement read at trial may cause jurors to pay more attention to the
information as it is evidence admitted without any of the usual
evidentiary foundations. This practice may also bring the focus back
onto the important disputed issues at trial.
V. A SUGGESTED SUPPLEMENT TO CIPA: THE
PROSECUTOR’S DUTY TO SEARCH IC’S FILES AND
SUBSEQUENT DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS.
As intelligence collection has increased over the last decade,
prosecutors should worry about what is hiding in IC’s files, and whether
they now have an additional duty to search intelligence agencies’ files
for discovery materials. Discovery obligations of federal prosecutors are
governed by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26.2, the
104
105
106
Jencks Act, Brady v. Maryland, and Giglio v. United States. In
Kyles v. Whitley, the Supreme Court held that “the individual prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting
107
on the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.” The
decision in Kyles implies that prosecutors should search for
discoverable material in every file of an agency “acting on the
government’s behalf,” regardless of whether the material is classified or
108
otherwise protected. There are certain instances where prosecutors
information. Defendants may not cross examine a particular witness regarding
the underlying classified matters set forth in these admissions. You must decide
what weight, if any, to give to these admissions.
United States v. Salah, 462 F. Supp. 2d 915, 924 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
104
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006).
105
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
106
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
107
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
108
Id.
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should clearly be able to anticipate these discovery obligations to search
intelligence agencies’ files. That obligation to search should exist if: (1)
the intelligence agency is part of the investigation team or is otherwise
109
“aligned with” the prosecution, (2) there is a possibility the IC may
have information due to the type of crime charged (i.e., terrorism or
espionage) and the IC generally conducts investigations on similar
subject matter, (3) the defendant has a good faith basis to request a
search of the IC file (i.e., to support his public authority defense), or (4)
the prosecutor knows either through the defendant, a witness, a law
enforcement agent, or otherwise, that an intelligence agency may have
some classified information that may be Brady, Giglio, or Jencks
110
material concerning a potential government witness.
A grayer area begins to emerge in situations where the prosecutor
has no knowledge of Brady, Giglio, or Jencks material (concerning
potential government witnesses) contained within intelligence agencies’
files, but there is always the possibility that the IC may have some
109
If an intelligence agency was involved in prosecution decisions, if law enforcement
and an intelligence agency conducted complementary efforts and coordinated efforts, or if
the intelligence agency provided information which directly supported the prosecution’s
investigation, then it is more likely the intelligence agency is “acting on the government’s
behalf in the case,” and the prosecutor should search the agency’s files for discoverable
material. Id. Members of a prosecution team have included federal, state, and local law
enforcement officers; other government officials participating in the investigation and
prosecution of the criminal case against the defendant; and those over whom the prosecution
exercises control. See Smith v. Sec’y of New Mexico Dep’t of Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 825 n.36
(10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the obligation to search another county’s files was triggered
when a prosecutor had actual knowledge of an investigation by another county into the same
homicide); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding a
prosecutor’s duty to disclose extended to material maintained by branches of government
“closely aligned with the prosecution”); United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970-71
(3rd Cir. 1991) ( “declin[g] to excuse non-disclosure in instances where the prosecution has
not sought out information readily available to it” when the government failed to run a
search of Virgin Island criminal records on prosecution witnesses in a St. Thomas trial);
United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 570 (5th Cir. 1979).
110
These four categories are similar to those found in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL, TITLE 9: CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL §
2052, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9
/crm02052.htm [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL]. According to the Criminal
Resource Manual, prosecutors must request that the IC search its files for material to make
available for review when the prosecutor has direct or reliable knowledge of potential
Brady, Giglio, Jencks Act, Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 16, and/or other discovery material in the
possession of the IC, or there exists a reliable indication suggesting that the IC might
possess evidence that is discoverable, including but not limited to the fact that an agency has
become an “active participant” in, aligned with, or participated jointly in the investigation or
prosecution of a case. Id.
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intelligence information on the defendant. Does the prosecutor have a
duty to search when the four scenarios discussed above do not apply? In
111
the aftermath of the Stevens case, where prosecutors are paranoid they
could be found to have failed in their discovery obligations, Congress
should set clear discovery guidelines to direct (and protect) prosecutors
as to when they must search IC’s files. What prosecutors should not be
112
required to do is conduct a “prudential search” in the pre-indictment
stage of the case to determine whether any intelligence information will
113
fall within the prosecutor’s discovery obligations to the defendant.
Similarly, mandatory searches conducted merely to determine whether
an intelligence agency has any classified information on a particular
target would be unduly burdensome on both intelligence agencies and
prosecutors alike. Intelligence agencies are not equipped to handle an
inordinate amount of discovery requests from prosecutors and are not
set up to allow for quick searches for exculpatory and impeachment
evidence on particular individuals. The intelligence agencies’ task is not
to develop evidence on a particular target, but rather to collect a large
111
In the case against former Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska, a federal judge in the
District of Columbia dismissed Stevens’ conviction on April 7, 2009, and named a special
prosecutor to investigate the prosecutors on the case to determine whether they should be
prosecuted criminally for withholding impeachment evidence in the case. Neil A. Lewis,
Tables Turned on Prosecution in Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2009,
www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/us/politics/08stevens.html.
112
A “prudential search” is defined as
[a] search of Intelligence Community (IC) files, usually prior to indictment, for
pre-existing intelligence information undertaken because the prosecutor and the
Department have objective articulable facts justifying the conclusion that the
files in question probably contain classified information that may have an
impact upon the government’s decision whether to seek an indictment and, if so,
what crimes and defendants should be charged in that indictment.
CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 110, at § 2052.
113
This requirement would not preclude a prosecutor from conducting a prudential
search — in some cases, it may be helpful. For example, a narcotics prosecutor may not
want to charge a defendant with a hefty 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) narco-terrorism violation (which
carries a statutory minimum of “not less than twice the minimum punishment” of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841, the most commonly charged drug trafficking statute) if they learn intelligence
information exists which would limit the defendant’s potential future cooperation. See 21
U.S.C. § 841 (2010); 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (2010). The defendant may be precluded from
testifying against other defendants or future targets because the intelligence information
concerning the defendant would constitute Jencks material and an adequate substitution may
not exist. Thus, a defendant facing a stiff penalty under § 960(a) may have no other option
than to proceed to trial if cooperation with the government under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
(Substantial Assistance to Authorities) cannot even be offered as a possibility. Preindictment, prosecutors can take the intelligence information found into consideration and
charge him under 21 U.S.C. § 841 with no possibility of cooperation.
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amount of information in a short period of time — some intelligence
will be analyzed, some stored, and other intelligence quickly
114
discarded. This information is not stored as a resource to be used one
day as evidence at trial, but is meant to serve its own purpose, i.e., to
115
inform United States officials of national security threats, and possibly
be discarded in its original form and a summary or report kept in its
stead. Therefore, unless the four scenarios described above are
applicable, a prosecutor should not have an affirmative duty to search
IC files. CIPA should be amended to reflect prosecutors’ discovery
obligations in national security-related investigations or prosecutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States government maintains certain sources and
methods at a classified level and withholds information from the public
at large in order to protect its security. What seems to concern most
people is that this entails a great deal of trust on our part that our
government is not abusing this right. The IC must continue to collect
intelligence in a new and ever-changing world where foreign and
domestic-based spies and terrorists pose increasing threats to national
security. While law enforcement agencies continue to capture alleged
114

The Intelligence Community gathers the raw data used to produce finished
intelligence products. Collection can
be from open sources, such as newspapers, or from clandestine sources, such as
other people or technical means
. . . . [T]he Intelligence Community converts the information that is collected
into a usable format such as by language translation or decryption. . .
Intelligence officers analyze processed information to turn it into finished
intelligence.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 17-18. As stated in the
National Intelligence Strategy,
[t]he Intelligence Community faces an explosive growth in type and volume of
data, along with an exponential increase in the speed and power of processing
capabilities. Threats to our networks and integrity of our information have
proliferated. Our partners and users increasingly expect us to discover, access,
analyze, and disseminate intelligence information in compressed time frames.
We have the responsibility to share information, while protecting sources and
methods and respecting the privacy and rights of U.S. citizens.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY, supra note 10, at 14.
115
“The U.S. Government uses intelligence to improve and understand the
consequences of its national security decisions. Intelligence assists policy decisions, military
actions, international negotiations, and interactions with working-level contacts in foreign
countries. In some circumstances, it can also aid homeland security providers and first
responders.” NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: A CONSUMER’S GUIDE, supra note 10, at 6.
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criminals and gather evidence admissible that will be in court, so too
must intelligence agencies continue to collect raw intelligence on
certain targets which enhance our ability to address all criminal and
national security threats. In order to be more successful in both
disciplines, a determination must be made as to how to mix the two
entities together — in the courtroom. CIPA has been the best procedural
guide so far on how to introduce classified information into a criminal
court, but the 1980 CIPA needs to be revised to ensure that judges
consistently follow guidelines in both section 4 and section 6 hearings.
Revisions should take into consideration both the defendant’s right to a
fair trial and the government’s need to protect national security. On
another note, prosecutors and intelligence collectors are occasionally at
odds with one another. Tension can develop when information deemed
too sensitive to be released by the IC is requested by a prosecution team
for trial purposes. The IC is tasked with collecting this intelligence and
is fiercely protective of their sources and methods; the prosecution is
constrained by a different obligation, to search government agencies’
files and possibly disclose that evidence to the defense in an original or
substituted form. If the CIPA statute was expanded to include
prosecutorial obligations and options which address such issues as when
to search IC files and the consequences of these actions, these
amendments might represent an acceptable compromise to all parties
involved in the process.

